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 The Legacy of the Cameron-Clegg Coalition 
Programme of Reform of the Law on the Supply 
of Goods, Digital Content and Services to 
Consumers 
 
James Devenney* 
 
Introduction 
The Cameron-Clegg coalition (2010-2015) oversaw a programme of “fundamental” reform of 
core consumer law in the UK.1  These reforms were partly driven by EU legislation,2   
particularly the Consumer Rights Directive (2011).3  Other factors were more native to the UK.  
Thus, against the backdrop of the global financial crisis and a desire to strengthen the UK 
economy, this programme of reform was fuelled by a market-driven approach to consumer 
law.4  More specifically, consumer law and confident consumers were viewed as key 
ingredients to the efficient functioning of the market and the development of the economy.5 
The centrepiece of the resulting reforms is, undoubtedly, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 
which, eventually, gained Royal Assent after an epic6 passage through Parliament: 
 “I am glad I have woken the hon. Gentleman…The Government have had a year in which to get the 
[Consumer Rights] Bill through…This Government have an inbuilt practice of trying to get Bills through 
the House as quickly as possible, which is why they have ended up with a logjam in the other place. 
That is not good for this House, because the Bills do not receive proper scrutiny… They have not only 
needed amendment in the other place but come back to this House, at which point the Government 
themselves have had to table reams and reams of amendments. That is about bad drafting of 
legislation.”7 
                                                          
*  McCann FitzGerald Chair in International Law and Business, UCD, Ireland & Professor of Transnational 
Commercial Law, University of Reading, UK. 
1  See Department for Business, Innovation and Skills [BIS], Draft Consumer Rights Bill: Government Response 
to Consultations on Consumer Rights (BIS/13/916, June 2013) p.3. 
2   See Consumer Rights Act 2015: Explanatory Notes pp.2-5.   
3   Directive 2011/83/EU [2011] OJ L 304/64. 
4  See, for example, BIS, Draft Consumer Rights Bill: Government Response to Consultations on Consumer Rights 
(BIS/13/916, June 2013) p.9.  On the approach of the Blair administration see W. Grant, Economic Policy in 
Britain (Palgrave, 2002) at p.230ff. 
5  Cf. B. Heiderhoff & M. Kenny, ‘The Commission’s 2007 Green Paper on the Consumer Acquis: deliberate 
deliberation?’  [2007] ELR 740 at 742. 
6   The key provisions largely came into force on 1st October 2015 and do not have retrospective effect. 
7   Hansard HC vol 590 col 684-685 (12 January 2015) per Kevan Jones MP (emphasis added). 
Unfortunately, as subsequently noted by the Court of Appeal,8 the spectre of these drafting 
issues haunt the Act; and the Law Commission have already called for a significant 
amendment to the Act.9  This paper, which focuses primarily on Part 1 of the Act, will explore 
these criticisms, highlighting the (unnecessary) complexity created by the Act. It will also 
explore the policy aims of the Act arguing that whilst many of the stated policy aims 
undoubtedly make good political sound bites, some of them were formulated with insufficient 
precision, depth or appreciation of existing nuances in the law.  Indeed this paper will 
question to extent to which the strategies adopted by the Act have, or indeed could have, 
achieved the stated policy aims.  In particular, it will lament the continued (conservative with 
a small ‘c’) use of particular concepts and understandings.  Significantly the paper will also 
place the Act in the context of other developments in consumer law, including the Consumer 
Protection (Amendment) Regulations 2014,10 Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation 
and Additional Charges) Regulations 201311 and relevant case law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union.  It will argue, on the one hand, that there is dissonance between the Act 
and some of these other developments and, on the other hand, that aspects of the Act sit 
uncomfortably with EU Law (which will it seems continue to be highly relevant even after 
Brexit).12  Overall, and despite some welcome developments, this paper will argue that these 
reforms and an Act which had such an epic passage through Parliament are an epic 
disappointment. 
Policy Aims 
(a) Streamlining of Consumer Rights13 
One of the drivers for reform was the view that UK consumer law had become “unnecessarily 
complex”.14  There are, of course, a number of reasons why this may have been the case.15  
To give just one example: the way in which the UK has often implemented EU directives by 
merely copying them into secondary legislation,16 with little attempt to integrate them into 
existing frameworks, has sometimes done little to aid the coherence of consumer law (such 
as with the previously overlapping, yet contrasting, provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms 
                                                          
8   Salt v. Stratstone Specialist Limited [2015] EWCA Civ 745 at [49] per Roth J. 
9  See Law Commission, Consumer Prepayments on Retailer Insolvency Law Com. No 368 (2016) at p.114: “We 
recommend that section 4 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 should be amended to include new rules about when 
a buyer acquires ownership of goods in a contract for the sale of goods from a business to a consumer.”   
10  SI 2014/870. 
11  SI 2013/3134. 
12   The Department for exiting the European Union has stated: “[t]o maximise certainty, therefore, the Bill will 
provide that any question as to the meaning of EU-derived law will be determined in the UK courts by reference 
to the CJEU’s case law as it exists on the day we leave the EU.” (Department for Exiting the European Union, 
Legislating for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, (Cm 9446, updated May 2017) at 
2.14 (emphasis added)). 
13  BIS, Draft Consumer Rights Bill: Government Response to Consultations on Consumer Rights (BIS/13/916, 
June 2013) p.5. 
14  Ibid. 
15   Cf. J. Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-
Regulatory’ World’ (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 103. 
16  See HM Treasury, Davidson Review: Implementation of EU Legislation (2006).   
Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999).17  Yet a spring clean 
of the statute books is not a panacea; much more needs to be, for example, done in terms of 
disseminating information about consumer rights and remedies before it can be claimed (with 
real force) that “… [the Consumer Rights Act 2015] streamline[s] key consumer rights so that 
people can access what they need to know more easily and effectively”.18  Moreover, there 
are also risks with such spring cleaning exercises.  First there is a danger that the streamlining 
will go too far and the resultant law will be sanitised to such an extent that important 
intricacies, nuances or safeguards will be lost.19  We shall return to this point below when we 
consider the definition of a consumer in the Consumer Rights Act 2015.20  Secondly, and this 
is linked to the fact that interpretation does not take place in a vacuum,21 there is a risk that 
spring cleaning will result in a conflation of differing policy aims.  To give an obvious example, 
some of the relevant provisions of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 emanate from EU 
legislation22 and all that this entails in terms of interpretation etc;23 and whilst it may be that 
UK and EU consumer law are converging on a market orientated approach to consumer law 
where consumer as regarded as significant actors, it needs to be borne in mind that national 
and EU approaches to consumer policy may have different drivers.24  This is, of course, linked 
to a more general point: there needs to be clarity and transparency about the objective or, 
more likely, objectives of relevant areas of consumer law;25 and this needs to be balanced 
against the policy aim of accessible consumer rights.26  It may be that a better way of 
balancing these two competing aims would have been to supplement the statute, which will 
almost inevitably contains detailed legal language, with documents written for consumers 
and which distil consumer rights etc.27 
                                                          
17   See, for example, Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts, (Law Com No 2929 (2005), Cm 6464) at [3]. 
18  See Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Draft Consumer Rights Bill: Government Response to 
Consultations on Consumer Rights (BIS/13/916, June 2013) p.4. 
19  For example, s.14(2), Sale of Goods Act 1979 previously provided: “Where the seller sells goods in the course 
of a business, there is an implied term that the goods supplied under the contract are of satisfactory quality” 
(emphasis added).  This wording, which was introduced into the Sale of Goods Act 1893 in 1973, clearly included 
packaging etc. as well as goods which should not have been supplied under the contract: see M. Bridge, 
Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (9th edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2014) at 11-030.  Interestingly s.9, Consumer 
Rights Act 2015 reverts back to the initial wording: “Every contract to supply goods is to be treated as including 
a term that the quality of the goods is satisfactory” (emphasis added).  Will the courts interpret this phase widely 
along the lines of Wilson and Another v Rickett Cockerell & Co. LD [1954] 1 Q.B. 598?   
20  See XXX. 
21  Cf. Bank of England v. Vagliano Bros [1891] AC 107. 
22  For a list of the seven main pieces of EU legislation implemented, or partially implemented, by the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015 see Consumer Rights Act 2015: Explanatory Notes p.3. 
23   See, generally, J. Devenney & M. Kenny, ‘Unfair Terms, Surety Transactions and European Harmonisation: 
A Crucible of Europeanised Private Law?’ [2009] Conv. 295-309. 
24  Cf. B. Heiderhoff & M. Kenny, op. cit. at 742. 
25  See XXX. 
26  See Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Draft Consumer Rights Bill: Government Response to 
Consultations on Consumer Rights (BIS/13/916, June 2013) p.4. 
27  Cf. Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts, (Law Com No 2929 (2005), Cm 6464) at [2.53]: “The 
Consultation Draft included examples of the kind of term that amounts to an exclusion or restriction of liability 
within the meaning of the legislation or that fall within our replacement for the UTCCR’s Indicative List of terms 
that may be regarded as unfair. While many consultees welcomed this, it was put to us that previous experience 
The Explanatory Notes also highlight the fragmentation of consumer law prior to the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015.28  Fragmentation has, of course, been a concern in relation to the 
interaction between EU Law and national law.29  Yet there has also been fragmentation within 
UK consumer law as a result, for example, of the patchwork30 of relevant provisions.  The 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 did attempt to consolidate some of UK consumer law but, in so 
doing, creates different fault lines.  For example, in relation to the sale of goods, the rules 
relating to the passing of property in goods are not consolidated in the Consumer Rights Act 
2015.31  This is not the place to rehearse the important of the passing of property in relation 
to sale of goods contracts32 and the Act does deal with issues of risk.33 However, other issues 
remain which raise issues about consumer protection, and ultimately consumer confidence, 
in the event of the seller’s insolvency.34  This was also seen as a significant omission from the 
proposal for a Common European Sales Law (CESL) and it was for this reason that the Law 
Commissions recommended including personal property law within the proposed CESL: 
 “Ideally, we think that the protection should go further than section 18 of the UK Sale of Goods Act 1979: 
property in the goods should pass as soon as the goods are labelled…This would mean that if a UK trader 
using the CESL becomes insolvent and, at that moment, its delivery van has reached the Polish border, the 
driver can continue to deliver the goods to the Polish consumers, rather than returning them to the UK.”35 
Interestingly, after the Consumer Rights Act 2015 gained Royal Assent, the Law Commission 
started to consult on these issues36 and proposed “…that consumer-specific provisions would 
be better made as amendments to the 2015 Act itself.”37  Similarly, issues around digital 
content overlap enormously with intellectual property rights, which are currently found in a 
different branch of the law, and this is another source of fragmentation.38  One further 
example is the traditional distinction in the Law of England and Wales between terms and 
representations.  The Act provides that certain terms (for example, that the “quality of the 
                                                          
of using examples in legislation has not always been happy: the examples may quickly become out of date and 
may turn out to be incorrect.” 
28  Consumer Rights Act 2015: Explanatory Notes p.2. 
29 See J. Devenney & M. Kenny (eds.), The Transformation of European Private Law: Consolidation, Codification 
or Chaos? (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
30  See, for example, J. Devenney, ‘Private Redress Mechanisms in England and Wales for Unfair Commercial 
Practices’ (2016) 5 EuCML 100. 
31  There are s number of provisions of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 which will continue to apply to consumers: 
see Consumer Rights Act 2015: Explanatory Notes p.24 which helpfully summarised these provisions. 
32  See J. Devenney & M. Kenny, ‘Omission of Personal Property from the Proposed CESL: The Hamlet 
Syndrome...Without the Prince?’ [2015] JBL 607. 
33  Consumer Rights Act 2015, s.29. 
34  See R. Bradgate, Commercial Law (3rd edn., OUP, 2000) p.391. 
35 Law Commission, An Optional Common European Sales Law: Advantages and Problems Advice to the UK 
Government (November 2012). 
36  Law Commission, Consumer Prepayments on Retailer Insolvency ((2015) Consultation Paper No. 221).  At 
p.1 it is stated: “Consumers often pay for goods and services in advance of receiving them. This is common  
practice for a range of products - from flights and theatre tickets to football season tickets and magazine 
subscriptions…If the company that has taken the prepayment becomes insolvent, consumers risk losing their 
money.” 
37  Ibid at p.168. 
38  See also European Commission, ‘A Digital Single Market for Europe: Commission sets out 16 initiatives to 
make it happen, 6th May 2015’ (IP/15/4919).  See also Consumer Rights Act 2015: Explanatory Notes p.69. 
goods is satisfactory”39) are included in, for example, contracts to supply goods.  The factors 
identified as being relevant to whether or not the quality of the goods is satisfactory have, in 
the context of the s.14(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, been developed in an iterative 
fashion40 and have eroded the term-representation dichotomy by, to some extent, giving 
contractual relevance to statements which might previously have been regarded as 
representations.41  Take, for example, the former s.14(2D) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
(which can be traced to the EU Consumer Sales Directive42 and which has evolved into s.9(4)-
(7) of the Consumer Rights Act 2015). This amendment to the Sale of Goods Act 1979, which 
confirmed the relevance of particular  public statements to the test of satisfactory quality, 
blurred (or, perhaps, formalised a blurring of43) the distinction between terms and 
representations by rendering such statements part of the contractual landscape.  S.13 of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 (which was a forerunner of s.11 Consumer Rights Act 2015) might 
have blurred the distinction even further by rendering all descriptive statements contractually 
binding44 although the Courts, ultimately,45 construed s.13 restrictively. This blurring on the 
term-representation dichotomy is continued by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 which, for 
example, includes a provision making certain pre-contractual (and indeed some post-
contractual!) information binding: 
“(1) Every contract to supply a service is to be treated as including as a term of the contract anything 
that is said or written to the consumer, by or on behalf of the trader, about the trader or the service, 
if— 
(a) it is taken into account by the consumer when deciding to enter into the contract, or 
(b) it is taken into account by the consumer when making any decision about the service after entering 
into the contract.” 
The key point for present purposes – as already recognised by Package Travel, Package 
Holidays and Package Tours Regulations 199246  -  is that non-contractual representations 
may, in reality, shape a consumer’s expectations as much as a contractual statement and, 
whilst the line between terms and representations continues to be blurred, there is 
fragmentation by the absence of the full treatment of representations in the Act.47  
(b) Clarification of Aspects of Consumer Law48 
                                                          
39  S.9(1) Consumer Rights Act 2015. 
40  See M. Furmston & J. Chuah (eds.), Commercial Law (2nd edn., Pearson, 2013) at p. 195ff. 
41  For example, Beale v. Taylor [1967] 1 WLR 1193. 
42  Directive 99/44/EC. 
43 See C. Willett, M. Morgan-Taylor and A. Naidoo, op. cit. at 111. 
44 A potential criticism of the case of Beale v. Taylor [1967] 1 WLR 1193.   
45  See Ashington Piggeries v. Christopher Hill Ltd [1972] AC 441. 
46  SI 1992/3288. 
47  See J. Devenney & G. Howells, ‘Integrating Remedies for Misrepresentation: Co-Ordinating a Coherent and 
Principled Framework’ in R. Merkin & J. Devenney (eds.), Essays In Memory of Jill Poole: Coherence, 
Modernisation and Integration in Contract, Commercial and Corporate Laws (forthcoming, Routledge 2018). 
48  Op. cit. at p.5. 
A second driver for reform was the perceived need to clarify particular aspects of consumer 
law.49  Again a number of examples could be mentioned but, for present purposes, we will 
limit ourselves to two examples.  First, the uncertainty surrounding the scope of Regulation 
6(2) of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (UTCCR 1999), which 
provided for important limitations on the reach of those Regulations, in the light of the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Office of Fair Trading v. Abbey National Plc.50 Secondly, 
where applicable, the uncertainty surrounding the length of time a consumer has to reject 
faulty goods.51  The Consumer Rights Act 2015 at least attempts to tackle both of these 
issues.52  Yet other areas of uncertainty are not tackled by the Consumer Rights Act 2015;53 
whilst others are only clarified in the accompanying Explanatory Notes;54 and some fresh 
uncertainties are created.55 
(c) Modernisation of Consumer Law, Particularly for the Digital Age56 
A further driver for reform was the need for modernisation, or at least updating, of the law 
particularly in a digital age.  Various examples could be given but we will limit ourselves to 
one at this point: the vexed question of whether the sale of computer software comes within 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 which, following St Albans City and DC v International Computers 
Ltd,57 seemed to depend on whether the software was transferred on a physical medium 
(such as a disk) or downloaded across the internet.58 Indeed more recently HHJ Waksman QC 
has observed: 
“…whatever the perception may have been in 1996, there is no logic in making the status of software 
as goods (or not) turn on the medium by which they were delivered or installed, as noted above.”59  
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 makes specific new provision in respect of contracts to supply 
digital content.60 
                                                          
49  See, for example, The Law Commission, Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods ((2009) LAW COM No 317) 
at 1.21: “Consultees told us that the problem with the right to reject is uncertainty over how long it lasts. This 
uncertainty brings complexity to what is intended to be a simple and certain tool.” 
50 [2009] UKSC 6. 
51 Cf. Law Commission, Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods ((2009) Law Com 317). 
52  Probably unsuccessfully in the case of the former: see J. Devenney & M. Kenny, ‘The Post-Brexit Legacy of 
EU Consumer Law in the UK: Chronic Rejection or Continued Acceptance?’ (2017) 1 EuCML 1. 
53  For example, in relation to the provisions on unfair terms (Part 2) the relevant standard to apply to some of the 
provisions.  
54  For example, how a reduction in price under s.24 should be assessed which is discussed on p.36 of the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015: Explanatory Notes. 
55  For example, the measure of damages for breach of  contract to supply goods to consumers: see XXX. 
56  Ibid. 
57  [1997] F.S.R. 251. 
58  Cf. R. Bradgate, ‘CONSUMER RIGHTS IN DIGITAL PRODUCTS: A research report prepared for the UK 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’ (2010) at pp.4-5: “As a result two consumers buying the same 
product with the same defect have different rights in law, the one buying a program on CD being treated as buying 
goods the other buying a program in intangible form by downloading it from the internet being held not to have 
purchased goods and therefore not to be entitled to the protection of the Sale of Goods Act.” 
59  Software Incubator Limited v Computer Associates UK Limited [2016] EWHC 1587 (QB) at [52]. 
60  See below at XXX. 
(d) Deregulation for Businesses61 
Deregulation can result in efficiency savings for businesses.62  In terms of costs for businesses 
thought also needs to be given to the costs associated with differences in consumer law 
regimes both within the UK63 and elsewhere;64 yet caution also needs to be exercised in 
connection with harmonisation in not stifling innovation of entrepreneurship.65  Deregulation 
can, of course, also positively impact on consumers in lowering prices.66   
(e) Selective Enhancement of Consumer Protection67 
Although one aim of the Act was selective enhancement of consumer protection, much more 
focus is on notions of confident consumers and consumers as economic actors.68  This is, of 
course, consistent with recent trends;69 yet retorts to notions of confident consumers, and its 
linkage with competition in the market, can often be vague and unsatisfying.70  For example, 
stating that “clearer consumer rights…will help to promote confident consumers”71 has a 
certain seductiveness about it but, as noted above72 and in addition to the nature73 of those 
consumer rights, we must be careful not to view this as a panacea; much will depend on, for 
example, dissemination of information on rights to consumers, consumer education and 
redress mechanisms and assistance.74  Indeed, as lawyers, we need to be careful not to over-
estimate the direct impact of consumer rights on consumer decision-making.75  One, related, 
                                                          
61  Ibid. 
62 See the claim in Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Draft Consumer Rights Bill: Government 
Response to Consultations on Consumer Rights (BIS/13/916, June 2013) p.5: “The reforms taken together are 
estimated to be worth over £4 billion to the UK economy over 10 years in quantified net benefits.”  . 
63  On the impact of devolution see Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Draft Consumer Rights Bill: 
Government Response to Consultations on Consumer Rights (BIS/13/916, June 2013) p.7. 
64  In relation to the EU Internal Market see EU Commission, Green Paper on policy options for progress towards 
a European Contract Law for consumers and businesses(COM(2010) 348 final) at p.2: “…differences between 
national contract laws may entail additional transaction costs and legal uncertainty for businesses and lead to a 
lack of consumer confidence in the internal market. Divergences in contract law rules may require businesses to 
adapt their contractual terms.” 
65  See N. Reich, ‘Competition of Legal Orders: A New Paradigm of EC Law?’ (1992) 29 CMLRev. 861. 
66  See V. Goldberg, ‘Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand’ (1974) 17 Journal of Law and Economics 
461. 
67  Ibid. 
68  See Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Draft Consumer Rights Bill: Government Response to 
Consultations on Consumer Rights (BIS/13/916, June 2013) p.4. 
69  See J. Devenney, ‘Conceptualising Consumers in the Law of England and Wales’, in F. Klinck & K. 
Riesenhuber, Verbraucherleitbilder: Interdisziplinare Und Europaische Perspektiven, (De Gruyer, 2015) p.164. 
70  Cf. Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Draft Consumer Rights Bill: Government Response to 
Consultations on Consumer Rights (BIS/13/916, June 2013) pp.4 and 9.  
71  Ibid. 
72 See XXX. 
73 Cf. Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Draft Consumer Rights Bill: Government Response to 
Consultations on Consumer Rights (BIS/13/916, June 2013) p.15 where it is stated that the reforms will result in 
“more effective consumer rights” (emphasis added).   
74  On the landscape of consumer enforcement bodies: see Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Draft 
Consumer Rights Bill: Government Response to Consultations on Consumer Rights (BIS/13/916, June 2013) pp.9 
and 15. 
75  Cf. for example, S. Della Vigna & U. Malmendier ‘Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence’ 
(2004) CXIX Quarterly Journal of Economics 353. 
theme that emerged from the legislative process was the centrality of “clear and honest 
information”76 to these reforms.  Again, in terms of consumer protection, care must be taken 
to recognise the limits on the extent to which the provision of information can cure the many 
varied and complex disadvantages under which different consumers may be operating.77   
Contracts to Supply Goods to Consumers78 
(a) Introduction 
Goods can, of course, be supplied to consumers in a number of ways such as under a contract 
of sale, a contract of hire, a hire-purchase contract, a contract of barter or a contract for work 
and materials.  Prior to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 contracts to supply goods to consumers 
were regulated by a variety of statutes. Some of the relevant provisions resonated across 
these statutes (such as the requirement that the goods needed to be of satisfactory quality79).  
There was, therefore, an argument to consolidate some of these provisions under the 
umbrella of contracts to supply goods80 which would avoid (or perhaps largely avoid) the need 
make sometimes fine distinctions between the different contracts81 especially where some 
legally very different transactions are, from the point of view of a consumer, functionally 
identical.82 This is broadly the approach which the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (Part 1, Chapter 
2) adopts, at least in respect of provisions relating to the rights and remedies of consumers 
under a “contract to supply goods”.83  One consequence of this consolidation of contracts to 
supply goods is that the ‘additional’ remedies introduced by the Sale and Supply of Goods 
Regulations 200284 to transpose the Consumer Sales Directive85 are extended to hire and hire-
purchase contracts.86 
(b) Application 
S.1(1) of the Act states that Part 1 “…applies where there is an agreement between a trader 
and a consumer for the trader to supply goods, digital content or services, if the agreement 
                                                          
76  See Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Draft Consumer Rights Bill: Government Response to 
Consultations on Consumer Rights (BIS/13/916, June 2013) pp.2 and 15. 
77 See J. Devenney, ‘Conceptualising Consumers in the Law of England and Wales’, op. cit. 
78  On choice of law see s.32 of the Act. 
79  Cf. M. Bridge, Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (9th edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2014) at 1-041.  
80  See, generally, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Consolidation and Simplification of 
UK Consumer Law (November 2010).   
81  Cf. Robinson v. Graves [1935] 1 KB 579.     
82  For example the distinction between a hire-purchase contract and a conditional sale contract where the price is 
payable in instalments: see Forthright Finance Ltd v. Carlyle Finance Ltd [1997] 4 All ER 90.  The functional 
equivalence has, to some degree, been recognised by the legislature: see s.27, Hire Purchase Act 1964.    
83  S.3(4).  S.3(2) outlines when Part 1, Chapter 2 applies.  For some purposes under the Act, distinctions between 
different types of contracts to supply goods are drawn: see, for example, s.17(3) (which is oddly drafted in that it 
appears to suggest, on a literal interpretation, that an owner may disturb a hirer’s quiet possession without having 
a legitimate ground for some doing!).  
84  SI 2002/3045. 
85  Directive 99/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees [1999] O.J. 
L171/7. 
86   Cf. Law Commission, Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods ((2009) Law Com 2.48-2.49). 
is a contract.”87  Central to the operation of this Part of the Act is the term “trader” which is 
defined, by s.2(2), in the following terms: 
“…a person acting for purposes relating to that person's trade, business, craft or profession, whether acting 
personally or through another person acting in the trader's name or on the trader's behalf.” 
Thus if, for example, the seller of goods does not come within this definition, particular 
statutory rights under ss.9-18 of the Act will not be applicable.  Under ss.14(2) and (3) of the 
Sales of Goods Act 1979 the implied terms that the goods are of satisfactory quality and fit 
for purpose only apply where the seller sold the goods in the “course of a business”. However, 
s.12 of the Sale of Goods Act (which contains implied terms relating to title etc.), s.13 of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 (an implied term that the goods correspond to description) and s.15 
(provisions relating to sales by sample) are not limited to situations where the seller sells in 
the course of a business.  Thus, to this extent, the Act reduces the reach of the protective 
provisions contained in such provisions although the extent of the problem with non-trader 
dealers is not clear88 and it may be that the common law will reach the same result anyway 
in some cases.89  Much will also depend on the interpretation of s.2(2).  At one stage it was 
assumed, as a result of R & B Customs Brokers v United Dominions Trust Ltd90, that a 
restrictive interpretation of the phrase “in the course of a business” would be taken, thus 
curtailing the reach of ss.14(2)-(3).  That case involved the phrase “deals as consumer” under 
s.12 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 which was then91 defined, as follows, using the 
phrase “in the course of a business”: 
“(1) A party to a contract “deals as consumer” in relation to another party if—  
(a) he neither makes the contract in the course of a business nor holds himself out as doing so; and 
(b) the other party does make the contract in the course of a business…” 
Ultimately the Court of Appeal was of the opinion that for these purposes a transaction would 
only be “in the course of a business” if it was either an integral part of the business or carried 
out with sufficient regularity.92  This case was intriguing for a number of reasons.  First, neither 
phrase used in the judgment (integral or sufficient regularity) is without ambiguity.  Secondly, 
the case demonstrated that a company could sometimes be a consumer for the purposes of 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.  Thirdly, the phrase “in the course of a business” was 
interpreted differently by the Court of Appeal in Stevenson v Rogers93 directly in the context 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.  In that case a fisherman sold his boat and the question for the 
court was whether or not the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.14(2) implied a term into this contract 
                                                          
87   Cf. s.33(2) (on contracts to supply digital content) where some free gifts are explicitly stated to come within 
the relevant provisions. 
88  Although consider the increased use of platforms such as eBay. 
89  Although cf. (in slightly different context) PST Energy 7 Shipping LLC Product Shipping & Trading SA v. OW 
Bunker Malta Ltd [2016] UKSC 23. 
90  [1988] 1 WLR 321. 
91  Following the Consumer Rights Act 2015, UCTA 1977 no longer applies to consumers. 
92  [1988] 1 WLR 321 at 330. 
93  [1999] QB 1028. 
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the sale was “in the course” of the fisherman’s 
business.  The Court of Appeal, acknowledging the different interpretation under the pre-
Consumer Rights Act 2015 version of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977,94 held that the sale 
was “in the course of a business” and therefore the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.14(2) applied.95  
At one level, of course, different interpretations of the phrase “in the course of a business” 
under different statutes need not be problematic.96  Yet, in the current context, the situation 
was more complicated as the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
overlapped.97  This, of course, goes someway to demonstrating the need, discussed above, to 
streamline consumer law; and there was a desire98 to align with definitions in the Consumer 
Rights Directive.  Yet care needs to be taken: the different interpretations, to some extent, 
increased protection for consumers; the wide interpretation in s.14 maximising the reach of 
those provision with the restrictive interpretation of s.12 curtailing, subject to the interplay 
between s.12(1)(a) and 12(1)(b), the circumstances in which a seller could exclude or limit 
liability.  At this stage, it is important to make two points.  First, in any spring clean it is 
important to have an awareness of the impact it may have on these types of nuances. 
Secondly, should a wide or narrow lens be used in determining whether or not “…a person 
acting for purposes relating to that person's trade, business, craft or profession”?  The point 
might be illustrated further by reference to Standard Bank London Ltd v Apostolakis99 which 
actually involved the converse definition, that of a consumer.  In that case the defendants (a 
lawyer and civil engineer) used their personal wealth to enter into a foreign exchange contract 
with a bank in Greece.  One of the questions for the Court was whether or not they acted as 
“consumers” under the UTCCR 1999.  Longmore J. held that the defendants were consumers 
for the purposes of the UTCCR 1999: 
“It is certainly not part of a person's trade as a civil engineer or a lawyer … to enter into foreign exchange 
contracts. They were using the money in a way which they hoped would be profitable but merely to 
use money in a way which they hoped would be profitable is not enough … to be engaging in trade.”100 
Interestingly, it seems that the Greek courts adopted a different view in the same case.101 
                                                          
94 “To apply the reasoning in the R & B Customs case…in the interests only of consistency, thereby undermining 
the wide protection for buyers which section 14(2) was intended to introduce, would in my view be an 
unacceptable example of the tail wagging the dog”: [1999] QB 1028 at 1041 per Potter LJ. 
95  See also I. Brown, ‘Sales of goods in the course of a business’ (1999) 115 LQR 384.  
96  See Feldarol Foundry Plc v Hermes Leasing (London) Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 747 at [18] Tuckey LJ.   
97  See s.61, Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
98  See Consumer Rights Act 2015: Explanatory Notes p.14.  However, there are differences between the 
definitions in the Directive and in the Act.  For example, in relation to the definition of a “consumer” the Act uses 
the phrase “wholly or mainly outside the individual’s trade, business, craft or professional” (emphasis added) 
whereas the Directive uses the phrase “…acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business, craft or 
profession”.   
99  [2002] CLC 933. 
100  Ibid at 936. 
101  Maple Leaf Macro Volatility Master Fund v Rouvroy [2009] EWHC 257 (Comm) at [209]. 
The term “consumer” has various meaning throughout the Law of England and Wales.102  For 
the purposes of the Act a “consumer” is defined as “…an individual acting for purposes that 
are wholly or mainly outside that individual's trade, business, craft or profession.”103  A 
number of observations need to be made in respect of this provision.  First, under the Act 
only natural persons can be consumers.  This is in contrast to the position under s.12 of UCTA 
1977 where, for example, small companies could be classified as consumers.104  This engages 
the debate about whether, for example, small enterprises should be given (some of) the same 
protection as consumers,105 especially where the corporate veil merely masks the economic 
reality.106  Secondly, there are doubts about whether or not the CJEU would define a 
“consumer” in the same way107 and the consequent issues of fragmentation.108  Thirdly, as 
already noted, such a definition can be viewed, with differing results, through a wide or a 
narrow lens.  Moreover, the question of whether or not “…an individual acting for purposes 
that are wholly or mainly109 outside that individual's trade, business, craft or profession” is a 
matter of degree.  So to what extent, if at all, might perceptions of the vulnerability, or 
otherwise, of the party in question impact on this decision?  Barclays Bank Plc v. Kufner,110  
provides some suggestion that this judgement may be affected by perceptions of 
vulnerability: 
“I must confess that I reach this conclusion without regret, for I cannot believe that the framers of the 
Regulations or the 1993 Directive intended that someone with the bargaining power of Mr Kufner and 
who procures the purchase of the component parts of a business at the cost of several millions of Euros 
should have the protection afforded by the legislation.”111 
(c) Consumer Rights under a Contract to Supply Goods 
Part 1, Chapter 2 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 sets out various statutory rights in respect 
of contracts to supply goods.  These statutory rights are formulated by “including a term” in 
the contract that, for example, the “quality of the goods is satisfactory”112 (and many are 
fortified by s.31 which prohibits their exclusion or restriction). Such a technique, where 
Parliament supplements the terms of a contract to supply goods, is, of course, well known. 
However, there are two notable features to the approach of the Consumer Right Act 2015 in 
this regard.  First, there is a subtle shift away from the language of an implied term to merely 
“including a term” in the relevant contract.  Secondly, and more importantly, unlike under the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 such terms are not classified as conditions or warranties with the 
                                                          
102  See J. Devenney, ‘Conceptualising Consumers in the Law of England and Wales’, op. cit. Cf. Overy v Paypal 
(Europe) Ltd [2012] EWHC 2659. 
103  See s.2(3).   
104 R & B Customs Brokers v United Dominions Trust Ltd  [1988] 1 WLR 321.   
105 Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts, (Law Com. No 292 (2005)) at [5.5]ff. 
106  Law Commission, Unfair Terms in Contracts, (Law Com. No 292 (2005)) at [5.14]. 
107  See H. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, (32nd edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) para. 38-040. 
108  Ibid. 
109  Emphasis added. 
110  [2008] EWHC 2319 (Comm). 
111  At [31] per Field J. 
112  S.9(1). 
associated impact on available remedies.  Instead the Consumer Rights Act 2015 expressly 
sets out the remedies for breach of these statutory terms.  At one level this, as was the 
intention,113 simplifies this area of law: there is no need for businesses or consumers to 
understand the significance of the distinction between conditions are warranties.114 Yet any 
such gains need to be set against the complexity of the (partial115) remedial framework under 
the Act.116 
A number of the terms now included, by virtue of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, into relevant 
contracts are familiar: for example the goods must be of satisfactory quality (s.9), the goods 
must be fit for a particular purpose (s.10), the goods must correspondence with sample 
(s.13)117 and the trader must have the right to supply the goods etc. (s.17).118 Therefore the 
previous case law under, for example, s.14, Sale of Goods Act 1979 will be relevant although 
care should be taken to recognise the purely consumer context of the new regime.119 S.11(1) 
(“Every contract to supply goods by description is to be treated as including a term that the 
goods will match the description”), resonates with, for example, s.13, Sale of Goods Act 1979.  
Yet s.13, Sale of Goods Act 1979, at least as interpreted by the House of Lords in Ashington 
Piggeries Ltd v. Christopher Hill Ltd,120 is an enigma; essentially the House of Lords took a 
rather narrow, generic approach to the meaning of ‘description’ for the purposes of s.13, Sale 
of Goods Act 1979. 
This, combined with the fact that s.13 seems not to traverse the traditional term-
representation dichotomy, raises a real question about the utility of s.13, Sale of Goods Act 
1979.  Is such an approach to be carried over into the Consumer Rights Act 2015?  We have 
already noted the need to recognise the consumer context of the new regime as well as the 
possible role of representations in shaping consumer expectations.  Yet there is little express 
direction towards a different interpretation of s.11, Consumer Rights Act 2015.  On the other 
hand s.11(4) provides: 
“Any information that is provided by the trader about the goods and is information mentioned in 
paragraph (a) of Schedule 1 or 2 to the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional 
Charges) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/3134) (main characteristics of goods) is to be treated as included 
as a term of the contract.” 
The “main characteristics” of the goods is arguably wider than words which “identify the kind 
of goods”.  There are also some new terms under the Act, in particular s.14 (“[g]oods to match 
                                                          
113 See Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Consolidation and Simplification of UK Consumer Law 
(November 2010) at 7.32: “Classifying terms as either conditions or warranties, whilst not problematic for those 
legally trained, is likely to mean very little to the ordinary consumer.” 
114  Although it may be necessary for other purposes such as breach of an express term: cf. s.19(11)(e). 
115  See, for example, s.19(11) on remedies not consolidated in the Act. 
116  See below at XXX. 
117 S.13 actually uses the phrase “match the sample”.   
118 Presumably this will be interpreted widely as in Niblett v. Confectioners’ Materials Co [1921] 3 KB 387 
(trademark infringements). 
119 See H. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, (32nd Edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) para. 38-462. 
120  [1972] AC 441. 
a model seen or examined”121) and s.12 (“[o]ther pre-contract information included in 
contract”): 
“(1) This section applies to any contract to supply goods. (2) Where regulation 9,122 10123 or 13124 of the 
Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013…required 
the trader to provide information to the consumer before the contract became binding, any of that 
information that was provided by the trader other than information about the goods and mentioned in 
paragraph (a) of Schedule 1 or 2 to the Regulations (main characteristics of goods) is to be treated as 
included as a term of the contract.” 
This provision is not straightforward, not least as s.12(1) states that it “applies to any contract 
to supply goods” whereas the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional 
Charges) Regulations 2013 sometimes limit a particular information requirement to a 
particular type of contract (for example a sales contract125).126 Moreover it is not always clear 
exactly how some of these terms, emanating are to operate,127 particularly when read with 
s.12(3), Consumer Rights Act 2015.128  For example, under Schedule 1, paragraph (b) “the 
identity of the trader (such as the trader's trading name), the geographical address at which 
the trader is established and the trader's telephone number…”.  Presumably this does not 
mean that, for example, the trader cannot change telephone number or cannot change it 
without the agreement of the consumer (or all relevant consumers!)?  Is the relevant 
requirement to somehow make available129 changes to a telephone number?130 
(d) Unfair Commercial Practices…and the Privatisation of Remedies 
Before we move on to consider remedies for breach of the foregoing statutory rights, we need 
to consider, briefly, recent statutory developments in relation to unfair commercial practices.  
As is well-known, the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (“CPUTR 
2008”)131 largely transpose the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive132 into the UK. A 
commercial practice is defined widely133 and in R v. X Ltd134 the Court of Appeal confirmed 
that isolated incidents can constitute a commercial practice.  For present purposes, it suffices 
                                                          
121  See Consumer Rights Act 2015: Explanatory Notes para. 77: “An example is a consumer viewing a television 
on the shop floor but receiving a boxed television from the stockroom. Under this section the delivered model 
should match the viewed model (unless any differences are brought to the consumer’s attention before it is 
bought).” 
122  On-premises contracts.  
123  Off-premises contracts. See, in particular, Regulation 10(1).   
124  Distance contracts.  See, in particular, Regulation 13(1).   
125  Defined by Regulation 5. 
126  See, for example, Schedule 2, para. (p). 
127  See also Regulation 18. 
128  “A change to any of that information, made before entering into the contract or later, is not effective unless 
expressly agreed between the consumer and the trader.” 
129  See Regulation 8. 
130  In Schedule 2 the corresponding requirement is expressed in slightly different terms. 
131  SI 2008/1277. 
132  Directive 2005/29/EC, OJ L149/22. 
133  Regulation 2. 
134  [2013] EWCA Crim 818. 
to note that an unfair commercial practice can include misleading actions and omissions.135 
There is, therefore, an overlap with the general law of misrepresentation.  This is pertinent to 
the current discussion for, at least, two reasons.  First, as argued above,136 non-contractual 
representations can certainly shape consumer expectations and, therefore, the term-
representation dichotomy creates a fragmentation; a fragmentation which, although in places 
eroded, is generally maintained by the Consumer Rights Act 2015.  Secondly, despite the 
theoretical distinction between terms and representations,137 it is clear that these two 
concepts are contextually closely related – indeed the distinction is often a fine one and a 
particular statement may even be both a term and a representation.138 Moreover an oddity 
of the current position is that damages, under the general law of misrepresentation, for pre-
contractual statements which were, in a general sense, not important enough to form part of 
the contract can sometimes, depending on the precise facts, exceed in quantum the damages 
which would have been payable had the statement in question been a contractual term.139  
The key point, of course, is that by excluding remedies for misrepresentation from the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 this fragmentation is further entrenched and - an Act which sought 
to, for example, streamline - only paints a partial picture of the relevant landscape. 
The CPUTR 2008 originally relied on a system of public enforcement, meaning a consumer 
wanting private redress from an unfair commercial practice had to fashion a remedy from 
pre-existing doctrines. Yet such an exercise was not always straightforward.140  Ultimately this 
resulted in calls for reform, especially against the backdrop of the strain on the public purse 
post-financial crisis.141 The Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 1999 (CPAR 2014) 
inserted a new Part 4A into CPUTR 2008 giving consumers specific private rights of redress in 
relation to the CPUTR 2008: the remedies are the unwinding of a contract, a discount and 
damages. Consumers are given these private redress rights in relation to misleading actions 
and aggressive practices but not specifically misleading omissions.142 Generally, and subject 
to rules on double recovery, these remedies operate in addition to existing possibilities for 
private redress under the general law.143  Unfortunately the CPAR 2014 is not a model of 
clarity in drafting. The remedy of unwinding is contained in the (amended) CPUTR 2008, 
Regulations 27E-H, with Regulations 27E-F dealing with business to consumer contracts.144 
The consequences of unwinding are that the contract comes to an end, the trader may have 
to give the consumer a refund and the goods must be made available for collection by the 
                                                          
135  See Regulation 3(4). 
136  See XXX. 
137  See E. Peel, Treitel: The Law of Contract, 14th ed., (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2015) Ch. 9. 
138 See Misrepresentation Act 1967, s.1. 
139  See J. Devenney, ‘Re-Examining Damages for Fraudulent Misrepresentation: Towards a More Measured 
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141  Ibid. 
142 CPUTR 2008, Regulation 27B. 
143 See CPUTR 2008, Regulation 27L but cf. Misrepresentation Act 1967 s.2(4). 
144 “[A] contract with a trader for the sale or supply of a product by the trader”.. 
trader.145 Under 27E(1) unwinding is available “…if the consumer indicates to the trader that 
the consumer rejects the product, and does so (a) within the relevant period [90 days], and 
(b) at a time when the product is capable of being rejected.”146  Significantly a consumer is 
generally not required to account for use of the product.147  
In terms of the remedy of a discount the (amended) CPUTR 2008 also provide a, fairly crude, 
sliding scale of the quantum of discounts.148 In terms of damages, which is of course an 
established remedy for misrepresentation in England and Wales, significantly a consumer is 
given the right to claim damages for “alarm, distress or physical inconvenience or discomfort” 
subject to a remoteness test.149 Unlike the other remedies, there is a due diligence defence 
(s27J(5)(b): “the trader took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to 
avoid the occurrence of the prohibited practice”). 
(e) Remedies under the Consumer Rights Act 2015, Part 1, Chapter 2 - Overview 
Ss.19-24 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 make provision in respect of remedies for breach 
of the statutory rights discussed above150  and a number of points need to be made about the 
scheme in the Act.  First, the remedial scheme adopted by the Act is not exhaustive; as is 
recognised by s.19(9)-(11) a consumer may have additional151 remedies not covered by the 
Act including damages, specific performance and termination.152  This is, perhaps, 
unfortunate given that one of the aims of the Act was to streamline this area of law.  
Interestingly the Act provides153 that s.51 (damages for non-delivery) and s.53 (damages for 
defective goods) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 no longer apply to consumers.  Presumably, 
however, a claim for damages by a consumer will still be assessed by analogy to, for example, 
the s.53, Sale of Goods Act 1979?  If so, presumably a consumer will still face difficulties in 
obtaining compensation for non-pecuniary losses such as anxiety, distress and upset;154 which 
makes an interesting contrast with the position for misrepresentation under the CPAR 2014.  
On the other hand, a number of the remedies of the seller are still governed by, for example, 
                                                          
145 Regulation 27F(1). 
146  Regulation 27E(8). 
147 Cf. Regulation 27F(7) in relation to continuous contracts such as some utility contracts. 
148 Regulation 27I (4):  “Subject to paragraph (6), the relevant percentage is as follows— 
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149  Regulation 27J (1). 
150  At XXX 
151  Cf. s.19(10). 
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not conform to the contract, except as provided by subsections (3), (4) and (6).”  
153  See Schedule 1, paras 28-30. 
154  Cf. Farley v Skinner (No.2) [2001] UKHL 49. 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979.155 Again it might have been thought helpful to include such 
important remedies into the new Act.156 
Secondly the Act adopts are rather elaborate157 framework for remedies, which is, perhaps, 
unfortunate given the streamlining and clarifying objectives of the Act.  At the start of the 
relevant remedies section of the Act, 19(1) outlines when goods conform to the contract:158 
essentially where the express terms as well as ss. 9 (satisfactory quality), 10 (fitness for a 
particular purpose), 11 (match description), 13 (match model), 14 (match sample), 15 
(situations where installation forms part of the contract) and 16 (link with digital content) are 
complied with.159   Given that these sections already signpost the relevant remedies160 it 
seems over-complicated to have this further layer between rights and remedies.  S.19(3) then 
goes on to specify the remedies for breach of all except two (namely express terms and s.15) 
of the requirements mentioned in s.19(1): 
“(a) the short-term right to reject (sections 20 and 22); 
 (b) the right to repair or replacement (section 23); and  
 (c) the right to a price reduction or the final right to reject (sections 20 and 24).” 
S.19(4) provides that the right to “repair or replacement” and the “right to price reduction or 
the final right to reject” are available for breach of an express term of breach of s.15; whereas, 
under s.19(6), breach of s.17(1) (right to supply etc.) gives rise to  a “right to reject”.  By 
contrast, where s.12 is breached: 
“the consumer has the right to recover from the trader the amount of any costs incurred by the 
consumer as a result of the breach, up to the amount of the price paid or the value of other 
consideration given for the goods.”161 
One can, of course, appreciate that, despite the move away from the traditional condition-
warranty dichotomy, different terms may merit different remedies;162 yet surely there is a 
less cumbersome way of so doing than is found in the Act?  Moreover what are the remedies 
for breach of s.17(2) (freedom from charges and encumbrances as well as quiet enjoyment)?  
Would price reduction not be an appropriate remedy?163 
The third, overall, point to make relates to the remedy of specific performance.  As is well 
known, the courts in England and Wales have traditionally tended not to grant specific 
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157  H. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, (32nd edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) para. 38-477. 
158  Cf. s.19(2) (materials supplied by the consumer).   
159  The language used in s.19(1) might be clearer: for example, “the goods not failing to conform” in (b).  
160  See s.15(2). 
161  S.19(5). 
162  Cf. Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Consolidation and Simplification of 
UK Consumer Law (November 2010) chapter 7. 
163  Under s.12(2) Sale of Goods Act 1979, where the equivalent of this term was classified as a warranty: see 
12(5A). 
performance where damages would be an adequate remedy.  A consumer would need to 
show, for example, that the goods were unique in some way in order to obtain an order for 
specific performance.  Given, the performance based nature of some of the remedies in the 
Act, might this change?  Similar issues were mooted following the introduction, as a result of 
the Consumer Sales Directive, of the additional remedies for consumers in the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979 back in 2003.164  There appears to be no clear evidence of such a shift at the moment.  
On the other hand, we must remember the EU origin of these provisions and s.58 of the Act 
provides that a court has power to order specific performance of the remedy of repair or 
replacement. 
(f) Right(s) to Reject 
Traditionally a consumer buyer, faced with, for example, a breach of one of the statutory 
implied terms under the Sale of Goods Act 1979,165 could prima facie reject the goods.  This 
was potentially a powerful self-help remedy for a consumer which also allowed the consumer 
to reclaim the price paid (if any) and claim damages for non-delivery.166 S.35 of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 (before the reforms emanating from the Consumer Rights Act 2015) provided 
that a buyer would be deemed to have ‘accepted’ the goods and, therefore to have lost the 
right of rejection in three situations: (i) express intimation; (ii) an act inconsistent with the 
ownership of the seller; or (iii) lapse of a reasonable time.  Yet, despite reforms made in 
1994,167 the doctrine of acceptance caused uncertainty for buyers and sellers.  For example, 
where the property has passed to the buyer what was meant by an act inconsistent with the 
ownership of the seller?168  What was meant by a reasonable time? 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 amended s.35 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 so as to remove 
consumer cases for its ambit.169 In broad terms it also provides for two rights of rejection: a 
short-term right under s.22 and a final right of rejection under s.24 (this is, of course, in 
addition to the new right of unwinding introduces for misrepresentation by the CPAR 2014!).  
In broad terms the short term right of rejection is a curtailed form of the traditional right of 
rejection and the final right of rejection is the right of rescission required under the Consumer 
Sales Directive.  S.20170 makes provision common to both forms of rejection: the consumer 
can reject by indicating to the trader the he/she is rejecting the goods and “treating the 
                                                          
164  See C. Willett, M. Morgan-Taylor and A. Naidoo, ‘The Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations’ 
[2004] JBL 94, 111. 
165  Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss.12-15. 
166  Under s.51. 
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169  Schedule 1, paragraph 24. 
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contract as at an end”;171 the consumer is entitled to a refund following rejection;172the 
consumer must make goods available for collection “or (if there is an agreement for the 
consumer to return rejected goods) to return them as agreed.”173  This last provision is a 
development on s.36, Sale of Goods Act 1979 which merely provided: “Unless otherwise 
agreed, where goods are delivered to the buyer, and he refuses to accept them, having the 
right to do so, he is not bound to return them to the seller, but it is sufficient if he intimates 
to the seller that he refuses to accept them.”  S.36 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 was 
sometimes thought to be harsh on the seller given that the risk is on them.174  Leaving aside 
questions of how and when the agreement to return the goods mentioned is s.20(7)(b) is 
formed, this may be a situation where the Sale of Goods Act 1979 is more generous to buyers 
than the new Act!175  S.20(15) helpfully provides that the refund must be given within 14 days; 
although, less helpfully from a consumer perspective, the clock starts ticking when the “trader 
agrees that the consumer is entitled to a refund.”176  
The time limit for the short-term right to reject is set-out in s.22.  Essentially a consumer has 
30 days177 in which to exercise the short-term right of rejection: 
“…beginning with the first day after these have all happened— 
(a) ownership or (in the case of a contract for the hire of goods, a hire-purchase agreement or a 
conditional sales contract) possession of the goods has been transferred to the consumer, 
(b) the goods have been delivered, and 
(c) where the contract requires the trader to install the goods or take other action to enable the 
consumer to use them, the trader has notified the consumer that the action has been taken.” 
The virtue of this provision is that it gives a clear (or, perhaps, fairly clear given the fact that 
there are exceptions178 and the clock starts ticking once, amongst others things, ownership 
has passed which, as this is based on the intention of the parties,179 can, sometimes, give rise 
to difficulties180) period in which the reject the goods; and the period seems, broadly, to 
accord with the expectations of consumers.181  Yet, on the other hand, it does seem, in broad 
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unjust enrichment excluded here?  
173  S.20(7)(b).   
174  See M. Bridge, Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (9th edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2014) at 12-067.  Cf. the 
duties of the buyer as a bailee. 
175  Note s.20(8) on costs, which seems to state that the trader must pay reasonable costs for the consumer to return 
the goods regardless of what is agreed in the above mentioned agreement. 
176  On the means of refund see s.20(16)-(17). 
177  Note that this can be extended, by not reduced, by agreement: see ss.22(1)-(2).   
178 See s.20(4). 
179  See s.18, Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
180  Cf. Kulkarni v. Manor Credit (Davenham) Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 69. 
181  See Law Commission, Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods ((2009) LAW COM No 317) at 3.52: “A 
secondary reason for choosing a 30-day period is that it appears to correspond with consumers’ 
terms, to reverse the general direction of travel in respect of the time in which rejection had 
to be exercised under s.35 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979;182  and it makes an interesting 
contrast with the 90 day ‘unwinding period’ under the CPAR 2014!  Moreover, it is not clear 
that 30 days is enough for some, more complex, goods.183 There is, of course, the final right 
of rejection which is further mapped out in s.24 and will be discussed further below. 
(g) Right to Repair or Replacement 
The former provisions on repair and replacement in the Sale of Goods Act 1979, emanating 
from the Consumer Rights Directive, are largely carried through to the s.23 of the Consumer 
Rights Act 2015.  Thus the trader must repair or replace the goods “within a reasonable time 
and without causing significant inconvenience to the consumer”;184 the trader must bear the 
costs of the repair or replacement (including, for example, postage);185 neither of these 
remedies can be exercised if it is impossible or disproportionate to the other of these 
remedies;186 and a consumer who requires or agrees the repair or replacement of goods 
cannot exercise the (now) short term right of rejection or the other remedy (of repair or 
replacement as the case might be) without giving the trader a reasonable time to repair or 
replace as the case might be.187   The Act adds a basic definition of repair.188 On the other 
hand, there is still some uncertainty over the proportionate test (particularly when dealing 
with low value goods) and the test for significant inconvenience;189  and this uncertainty may, 
given potential underlying inequalities in bargaining power, work to a trader’s advantage 
when seeking to resist a claim for repair or replacement.190 
(h) Right to price reduction and final right to reject 
The second level of remedies (price reduction or final right of rejection191) envisaged under 
the Consumer Sales Directive are provided for by s.24, Consumer Rights Act 2015.  As second 
level remedies they are only available where: a repair or replacement has not been 
successful;192 repair and replacement are impossible;193 or, following a request to repair or 
replace the goods, the trader breaches s.23(2)(a) (obligation to repair or replace within a 
                                                          
expectations…When consumers were asked to say how long the right should last, the most common reply, given 
by 30% of consumers, was that the right should last for about a month.” 
182  See Fiat Auto Financial Services v. Connelly 2007 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct) 111 (on the facts rejection of defective car 
possible after nine months). 
183  Cf. Law Commission, Consumer Remedies for Faulty Goods ((2009) LAW COM No 317) at 3.66ff. 
184  S.23(2)(a). 
185  S.23(2)(b). 
186 S.23(3).  Note under s.48B(3), Sale of Goods Act 1979 there was a further limitation: namely if 
“disproportionate in comparison to an appropriate reduction in the purchase price under paragraph (a), or 
rescission under paragraph (b), of s.48C(1)…”.   
187  See s.23(6)-(7). 
188  S.23(8). 
189  Defined in s.23(4)-(5).. 
190  Quaere: the burden of proof in relation to these limitations. 
191   S.24(5) makes it clear that these remedies operate as alternatives. 
192   S.24(5)(a).  See also s.24(6)-(7) on meaning of repair and replacement. 
193   S.24(5)(b). 
reasonable time and without significant inconvenience on consumer).194  The remedy of price 
reduction requires a trader to reduce (and return if already paid or transferred195) some or 
all196 of the price (or other consideration)197 under the contract.198   Unlike under the CPAR 
2014,199 where there is (a fairly crude) sliding scale of reductions, under the Act the price (or 
other consideration) is only stated as needing to be reduced by “an appropriate amount”.200  
Again this uncertainty may, given potential underlying inequalities in bargaining power, work 
to a trader’s advantage when seeking to resist a claim for a certain amount of reduction.  
Under the final right of rejection, any refund to the consumer may be reduced on account of 
the consumer’s use of the goods201 although this is subject to qualifications.202  
(i) Other rules 
Part 1 of the Act also makes various other provisions in relation to goods contracts.  Thus s.28 
makes provision, in relation to a “sales contract”,203 in respect of delivery.204  Prior to the Act, 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 made provision in relation to delivery in all contracts of sale of 
goods.205  Delivery was defined not as sending the goods as a consumer would perhaps expect 
but as a “voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another”.206 Significantly, 
delivery could be symbolic or constructive.207  In terms of the time for delivery, the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 provided: “Where…the seller is bound to send the goods to the buyer, but no 
time for sending them is fixed, the seller is bound to send them within a reasonable time.”208 
S.29(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 is dis-applied to consumer sales by the Consumer Rights 
Act 2015.209  The genesis of this provision was Article 18 of the Consumer Rights Directive, 
now transposed by s.28(3)-(4) of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.  Interesting s.59 defines 
delivery in similar terms to the 1979 Act.210 This, of course, raises the question of whether or 
not this provision would be interpreted in a similar fashion to s.29(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979.  From the point of view of consumer clarity this would be unfortunate given the 
                                                          
194   S.24(5)(c). 
195   S.24(1).     
196   S.24(2).  Quaere: what adjustments, if any, need to be made for use in such a situation?. 
197   Where the consideration is partly monetary and party non-monetary it is not clear whether or not the consumer 
or trader has a choice which to reduce.   
198  Cf. s.24(4). 
199  See above at XXX. 
200  S.24(7). 
201  S.24(8). 
202  See s.24(9)-(10). 
203  Was this a missed opportunity to consolidate delivery provisions in all contracts for the supply of goods? 
204  Note also s.26(5) on instalment deliveries.  
205  With the exception of s.29(3), Sale of Goods Act 1979 those provisions still apply to consumers which links 
to the fragmentation point above at XXX. 
206  S.61. 
207  Cf. Albright & Wilson UK v. Biachem Ltd [2002] UKHL 37. 
208  S.29(3), Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
209  See s.29(3A), Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
210  “’[D]elivery’ means voluntary transfer of possession from one person to another”. 
colloquial use of the word delivery211 and, indeed, it is not clear that such an approach would 
conform with the Directive.212   
S.26 makes provision in relation to delivery by instalments.  S.26(1) provides (as did s.31 of 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979) that, unless otherwise agreed, the consumer is not obliged to 
accept delivery by instalments.  Where delivery by instalments has been agreed and one or 
more of the instalments delivered is defective, can the consumer reject the totality of the 
goods and/or terminate the whole contract?  Traditionally this would, at least in part, depend 
on whether or not the delivery obligation was divisible or indivisible, a distinction which was 
far from straightforward;213 and, indeed, on the doctrine of acceptance.214 The latter is, of 
course, gone in relation to consumer sales215 but s.26 is premised on the latter (applying to 
divisible contracts).216  This is, perhaps, unfortunate from a consumer clarity perspective, not 
least as nowhere in the Act is the distinction between divisible and indivisible obligations 
mentioned or explained.217  The position is further complicated by curious provisions in 
s.20(20)-(21).  S.20(20) provides: 
“(20) Subsection (21) qualifies the application in relation to England and Wales…of the rights mentioned 
in subsections (1) to (3) where— 
(a) the contract is a severable contract, 
(b) in relation to the final right to reject, the contract is a contract for the hire of goods, a hire-purchase 
agreement or a contract for transfer of goods, and 
(c) section 26(3) does not apply.” 
Again the phrase “severable contract” may not mean much to the average consumer.218  
S.20(20)(c) seems to suggest that the provision applies to contracts other than those to which 
s.26(3) applies; in other words, severable contracts other than contracts where delivery is 
made by instalments which are separately paid for.  Yet if this is the case, why are sales 
contracts taken out of the scope of s.20(20) by s.20(20)(b)?  Could it be that s.26 was, despite 
its wording, only intended to apply to sales contracts? 
                                                          
211  How would the average consumer interpret s.28(2) (“[u]nless the trader and the consumer have agreed 
otherwise, the contract is to be treated as including a term that the trader must deliver the goods to the consumer” 
(emphasis added))? 
212   See Recital 55: “…consumer should be considered to have acquired the physical possession of the goods 
when he has received them.” 
213  Ibid. See also Maple Flock Co Ltd v Universal Furniture Products (Wembley) Ltd [1934] 1 K.B. 148. 
214  Certainly prior to the reform made to the Sale of Goods Act 1979 in 1995. 
215  See above at XXX. 
216  S.26 applied “…if the contract provides for the goods to be delivered by stated instalments, which are to be 
separately paid for” (emphasis added). 
217  S.26(3)-(4) merely states that the ability to reject the totality of the goods depends on the “circumstances of 
the case”!  . 
218  S.20(21) provides: “The consumer is entitled, depending on the terms of the contract and the circumstances 
of the case—(a) to reject the goods to which a severable obligation relates and treat that obligation as at an end 
(so that the entitlement to a refund relates only to what the consumer paid or transferred in relation to that 
obligation), or (b) to exercise any of the rights mentioned in subsections (1) to (3) in respect of the whole contract.” 
Contracts to Supply Digital Content to Consumers 
(a) Introduction 
Part 1, Chapter 3 makes specific new provision in respect of contracts to supply digital content 
and at this point a number of points needs to be made in respect of these provisions.  First, 
the provisions adopt a traditional contractual framework using, for example, what used to be 
called implied terms.  Secondly, s.33 deals with the contracts covered by Chapter 3.  S.33(1) 
provides that the Chapter applies to “a contract for a trader to supply digital content to a 
consumer, if it is supplied or to be supplied for a price paid by the consumer.”219  Thus, in 
terms of furnished consideration, Chapter 3 is narrower than Chapter 2 (where, of course, 
contracts supported by other forms of consideration are included220).221  On the other hand 
s.33(3) extends the definition of the price222 to include (in the words of the relevant 
Explanatory Notes): “token, virtual currency, or gift voucher, that was originally purchased 
with money (e.g. a magic sword bought within a computer game that was paid for within the 
game using “jewels” but those jewels were originally purchased with money).”  Moreover 
s.33(2) extends the coverage of the chapter to certain “free” digital content which is supplied 
with goods, services or other digital content (if the consumer has paid a price for those goods, 
services or other digital content).  
Thirdly, in terms of overlap with different Chapters in Part 1, s.1(4) makes it clear that more 
than one Chapter can apply to a particular contract if it is a “mixed contract”.223  Yet the 
demarcation is not entirely satisfactory.  Take, for example, the case of bespoke software 
supplied to a consumer.  This could arguably come within s.33(1) as a supply of digital content 
but it could also arguably come within s.48224 as a contract to supply a service.225  If the former 
option is taken the digital content would, for example, need to meet the (strict liability) 
standard of satisfactory quality;226 whereas if the latter option is taken the obligation would 
the (qualified liability) standard of reasonable care and skill227 would instead be applied.  
(b) Obligations 
Ss.34-41 of the Act establish consumers’ statutory rights in respect of the supply of digital 
content. Some of these rights, which are expressed through the contract containing a term to 
that end, are familiar and effectively mirror some of the obligations in goods contracts under 
                                                          
219  Emphasis added. 
220  See XXX. 
221  Note, however, s.33(5)-(6) and (9)-(10) giving the Secretary of State power to extend the reach of this Chapter. 
222  “The references in subsections (1) and (2) to the consumer paying a price include references to the consumer 
using, by way of payment, any facility for which money has been paid.” 
223  See also s.16 providing that goods do not conform to the contract if those goods include digital content which 
does not conform to the contract under s.42(1). 
224  See below at XXX. 
225  Cf. Saphena Computing Ltd v Allied Collection Agencies Ltd 3 May 1989 (unreported). 
226  See below at XXX 
227  See below at XXX. 
ss. 9-18 of the Act.228  Thus the digital content must be of satisfactory quality,229 the digital 
content must be fit for purpose230 and the digital content must match any description.231  
Similarly s.37 makes provision, similar to s.12,232 in respect of particular pre-contractual 
information.233  S.41, will deals with a trader’s right to supply digital content is also broadly 
familiar although, given that it is common for digital content to be merely licensed to the 
consumer, it uses the language of “right to supply” rather than “right to sell”.234 Curiously, 
however, s.41 does not include terms about quiet enjoyment235 and it does not apply to free 
digital content.236   
Other provisions are less familiar.  For example, s.39 deals, in fairly technical language, with 
transmission and continued transmission.  The focus of s.39 is on situations where the digital 
content is not supplied on a tangible medium (e.g. a disk or embedded in, for example, a 
washing machine237).  S.39(1)-(2) deals with the point of supply, which is akin to the point of 
delivery in relation to goods contract: 
“For the purposes of this Chapter, the digital content is supplied— 
(a) when the content reaches the device, or 
(b) if earlier, when the content reaches another trader chosen by the consumer to supply, under a 
contract with the consumer, a service by which digital content reaches the device.”238 
S.39(3)-(6) deals with situations where the consumer is to access the digital content through 
a “processing facility”.239  In such situations the processing facility must be available for a 
reasonable time (or other time specified in the contract)240 and ss.34-36 apply to each 
provision of digital content under such a facility.241 
Finally under s.47 liability for breach of ss.34, 35, 36, 37 or 41 cannot be excluded or restricted. 
(c) Remedies 
Chapter 3 also sets-out various remedies for situations where the trader fails to comply with 
the relevant statutory rights.  Perhaps disappointingly from the point of view of clarity in 
                                                          
228  Which, of course, raises the question of whether or not the consolidation aspect of the Act might have been 
more effective. 
229  S.34.  There are, however, some slight differences.  Thus: s.34(3) does not (in contrast to s.9(3)) refer to 
appearance and finish; and s.34(4) refers to trail versions instead of, under s.9(4), samples.   
230  S.35. 
231  S.36.  Note, however, that, unlike s.11, s.36 is not framed in terms of supplying by description.   
232   See above at XXX. 
233   See s.42 for remedies for breach of this term. 
234  As under, for example, s.17(1)(b). 
235  Cf. Rubicon Computer Systems Ltd v. United Paints Ltd (2000) 2 TCLR 454. 
236  On which see above at XXX.  Nor does it apply where the consumer provides non-monetary (in the extended 
sense described above at XXX) consideration. 
237  See Consumer Rights Act 2015: Explanatory Notes para 192. 
238  S.39(2). 
239  Defined in s.39(4).   
240  S.39(5). 
241  S.39(6).   
respect of consumer rights, the remedies outlined in Chapter 3 represent only some of the 
remedies available; remedies such as damages, specific performance and the recovery of 
money where the consideration has failed are governed by the general law.242 On the other 
hand, it is not possible to treat a contract at an end for breach of ss. 34, 35, 36, 37 and 41.243  
This provision, which is linked to the practical difficulties around effectively returning digital 
content,244 means that, in a sense, means that consumers of digital content are less protected 
than consumers of goods.245  S.42(2) provides two levels of remedy when the digital content 
does not conform to the contract:246 (a) the right to repair or replacement and (b) the right 
to a price reduction.  The detail of the remedies of repair and replacement247 largely mirror 
the corresponding provisions in relation to goods contracts.248 The remedy of price 
reduction249 also resonates with the remedy of price reduction in relation to goods contracts 
although there are some noticeable differences.250   
Chapter 3 also provides remedies in three other situations.  First, in respect of breach of s.41 
(right of trader to supply digital content), s.45 provides a consumer with a right to a refund251 
which, presumably, is without reduction due to use.252  Secondly, for breach of s.37 (other 
pre-contractual information included in contract), s.42(4) provides a remedy of costs resulting 
from the breach (up to the amount of the price paid253).  Finally, under s.46 a consumer is 
explicitly given remedies where: 
“(a) a trader supplies digital content to a consumer under a contract, 
(b) the digital content causes damage to a device or to other digital content, 
(c) the device or digital content that is damaged belongs to the consumer, and 
(d) the damage is of a kind that would not have occurred if the trader had exercised reasonable care 
and skill.” 
                                                          
242  S.42(7). 
243  S. 42(8). 
244  See BIS, Enhancing Consumer Confidence by Clarifying Consumer Law (July 2012) para 7.138.  On the other 
hand the remedy of rejection continues to be available for breach of an express term of a contract to supply digital 
content. 
245  Cf. s.16 (where digital content is provided on, for example, a disk). 
246  Conformity is judged by reference to ss.34-36 of the Act.  On presumptions of non-conformity see s.42(9)-
(10). 
247  See s.43. 
248  See s.23. 
249  See s.44.  The price could be reduced by 100%: see s.44(2). 
250  Under Chapter 3, subject to s.43(2) (repair or replacement to occur within a reasonable time and without 
significant inconvenience to the consumer), more than one attempt at repair or replacement may be possible before 
the right to price reduction becomes available.   
251  Note s.45(2): “If the breach giving the consumer the right to a refund affects only some of the digital content 
supplied under the contract, the right to a refund does not extend to any part of the price attributable to digital 
content that is not affected by the breach.” 
252  See XXX. 
253  This includes s.33(3). 
The remedies are repair254 and compensation.255  The latter remedy is intriguing as, arguably, 
that remedy would be available for breach of the term in s.34 or s.35.256  Indeed a claim under 
s.34 or s.35 might be preferable on the ground of the strict liability nature of such a claim.257 
The former remedy (repair) is innovative in that it seeks repair of damaged devices or digital 
content not supplied under the contract.258 
Contracts to Supply a Service 
(a) Introduction 
Part 1, Chapter 4 of the Consumer Rights Act deals with contracts “for a trader to supply a 
service to a consumer.”259  It makes, what might be termed, general provisions in relation to 
such contracts; leaving in place more specific provisions in particular service areas such as 
financial services;260 this is, of course, understandable given the highly specialised nature of 
some of those areas but it does result in a degree of fragmentation in relation to services and 
it may be necessary for the legislature to give further thought to the interactions in the 
(consumer) services legislative landscape.   
(b) Terms of the Contract 
Part 1, Chapter 4 makes a number of provisions in relation to the terms of a “contract to 
supply a service.”261  Some of these provisions are framed in fairly familiar terms: s.49 states 
that such contracts include a “term that the trader must perform the service with reasonable 
care and skill”;262 s.51 provides, in broad terms, that a reasonable price must be paid for a 
service where the price is not provided for by the contract; and s.52 provides for a term that 
a service must be provided in a reasonable time if the time is not provided for by the contract.  
Other provisions are less familiar.  We have already mentioned the blurring of the distinction 
between terms and representations in s.50(1)-(2).263 Moreover it is not possible to exclude 
liability for breach of s.49 or s.50 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.264 S.57(3) provides: 
“A term of a contract to supply services is not binding on the consumer to the extent that it would restrict 
the trader's liability arising under any of sections 49 and 50 and, where they apply, sections 51 and 52 
(reasonable price and reasonable time), if it would prevent the consumer in an appropriate case from 
                                                          
254  See s.46(3)-(4). 
255  See s.46(5)-(6). 
256  By analogy with H Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v. Uttley Ingham Co Ltd [1978] QB 791. 
257  Cf. H. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, (32nd Edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) para. 38-523. 
258  The nature of the ‘damages’ under s.46 is not clear.  The Consumer Rights Act 2015: Explanatory Notes para 
219 might be taken as suggesting the tortious measure.  
259  S.48(1).   
260  See s.53.  
261  Phrase used in s.48(4). 
262  Note s.15 of the Act which provides for strict liability in relation to a service: “(1) Goods do not conform to a 
contract to supply goods if—(a) installation of the goods forms part of the contract, (b) the goods are installed by 
the trader or under the trader's responsibility, and (c) the goods are installed incorrectly.”   
263  See XXX. 
264  See s.57(1)-(2).   
recovering the price paid or the value of any other consideration. (If it would not prevent the consumer 
from doing so, Part 2 (unfair terms) may apply.)” 
Unfortunately the drafting of this sub-section is not the model of clarity!  Does it mean that it 
is never possible to restrict liability under s.49 and s.50?  If so, would it not have been better 
to phrase s.57(1)-(2) in terms of exclude or restrict? Or does it mean that it is not possible to 
restrict liability under s.49 and s.50 to a sum below the contract price?265  Furthermore the 
Consumer Rights Act does not explicitly prevent the exclusion of liability arising under s.51 or 
s.52 but, at least on the second interpretation advanced in relation to the restriction of 
liability under s.49 and s.50, it would seem to be implicit in the barrier of the purchase price.266 
(c) Remedies 
The Act makes provision for breach of its statutory rights in relation to services contracts in 
ss.54-56.  The remedies provided are, as in the case elsewhere in the Act not exhaustive.  
Thus, in addition or instead of the remedies outlined in the Act,267 a consumer may, for 
example and where appropriate, claim damages, specific performance or termination of the 
contract.268  The framework of remedies provided by the Act in relation to services contracts 
is, perhaps, over-elaborate.  Essentially where the service those not conform to the contract, 
two remedies are provided by the Act: the right to repeat performance269 and the right to a 
price reduction.270  Conformity with the contract means compliance with s.49 (reasonable 
care and skill) and “the service conforming to a term that section 50 requires to be treated as 
included in the contract and that relates to the performance of the service.”271  The relevant 
terms under s.50 include the term relating to things said and written by the trader272 as well 
information to be provided by the trader under Regulations 9, 10 or 13 of the Consumer 
Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013.  Thus, in 
relation to the latter information, reference has to be made to, for example, Regulation 9 of 
the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 
which, in turn, refers onwards to Schedule 1 of the same Regulations!  Moreover it may be 
that there will be some debate as to whether some of the information which a trader is 
required to provide relates to “the performance of the service.”  For example, would the 
trader’s complaint handling policy come within this provision?273  Indeed, more generally, 
how, if at all, does the remedy of repeat performance operate where there has been a failure 
to provide relevant information under the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation 
                                                          
265 “It also makes clear that a trader cannot limit its liability for breach of these sections to less than the contract 
price”: Consumer Rights Act 2015: Explanatory Notes p.66. 
266  In terms of the scope of exclusions and restrictions see s.57(4)-(5).  
267  Note s.54(6) which provides that the consumer cannot claim twice for the same loss. 
268  S.54(7).  Note also s.54(1) on rights in the contract. 
269  S.55. 
270  S.56. 
271  S.54(2) (emphasis added). 
272  See above at XXX. 
273  Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, Schedule 1, para. 
(f). 
and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013?  On one view, the remedy of repeat performance 
does not apply as s.50(3) seems limited to information actually provided.274 Yet, even if s.50(3) 
is so limited, how would the remedy of repeat performance apply to certain informational 
requirements such as the provision of incorrect information about, if applicable, trader’s 
complaint handling policy?  Is it sufficient that the correct information is subsequently 
provided (where, perhaps, the consumer wishes to complain, not about the service provided, 
but about the manner in which the price was fixed under s.51(1)(b)275)?276  
Where there is a “breach of a term that section 50 requires to be treated as included in the 
contract but that does not relate to the service”277 or s.52 (performance in a reasonable time) 
then the sole remedy provided by the Act is a reduction in price (this is, of course, in addition 
to other remedies existing outside of the Act).  Where, on account of the service not 
conforming with the contract, the consumer potentially has a right to repeat performance 
and a right to a reduction in price, those remedies operate in a hierarchical fashion with the 
second remedy only available where repeating performance is impossible278 or the trader has 
failed to repeat performance within a reasonable time and without significant inconvenience 
to the consumer.279 The (new) right to require repeat performance is explained in s.55(1): 
“The right to require repeat performance is a right to require the trader to perform the service again, 
to the extent necessary to complete its performance in conformity with the contract.”280 
Significantly there is no requirement for it to be a proportionate remedy281 and so a consumer 
could, potentially, require repeat performance at a cost disproportionate to the benefit 
gained as a result of the repeat performance.282  It is not at all clear, given the deregulation 
agenda, that this have been an intended consequence of s.55.  The right to a reduction in 
price (which can be a reduction amounting to the full price283) is outlined in s.56(1): 
“The right to a price reduction is the right to require the trader to reduce the price to the consumer by 
an appropriate amount (including the right to receive a refund for anything already paid above the 
reduced amount).”284 
A refund under this section must be given without “undue delay” and within 14 days of the 
trader agreeing that the consumer is entitled to a refund.285  The formulation of this provision, 
                                                          
274  There may still, however, be a breach of contract. 
275  Quaere: could rudeness during the performance of a service potentially breach s.49? 
276  Perhaps on the ground that this ‘part’ of the service consists of providing information.  
277  S.54(4) (emphasis added). 
278  S.56(3)(a) referring to s.55(3).  See also Consumer Rights Act 2015: Explanatory Notes at para. 263:  “A 
consumer cannot require re-performance if it is impossible, for example this might apply if the service was time 
specific.” 
279  S.56(3)(b) referring to s.55(2)(a).  See also s.55(4). 
280  Emphasis added. 
281  See H. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, (32nd Edn., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2015) para. 38-541.. 
282  Quaere: when a court would order specific performance of this right (see s.58). 
283  See s.56(2). 
284  See s.56(5)-(6). 
285  S.56(4). 
which relies on the trader’s agreement, is, perhaps, unfortunate for the point of view of 
certainty for consumers. 
Conclusion 
The Cameron-Clegg coalition (2010-2015) initiated a significant programme of reform in 
respect of core consumer law.  That programme resulted, for example, in: a clearer separation 
of legislative provisions relating to consumer and commercial transactions; the consistent use 
of key concepts across a large part of core consumer law; a consolidation of the law on the 
supply of goods to consumers; the clarification of particular aspects of core consumer law 
(such as the amount of time a consumer has to reject faulty goods); specific new provision in 
respect of contracts to supply digital content; the creation of specific rights of private redress 
for unfair commercial practices; and a more integrated and coherent framework for the 
regulation of unfair terms.  These reforms took place against the spectre of the global financial 
crisis.  This can be seen, for example, in the (partial) privatisation of remedies for unfair 
commercial practices which, as we have seen, was driven by the weakness of the public purse.  
It can also be seen in the way in which the coalition adopted a largely market-driven approach 
to consumer; where consumer law and confident consumers were viewed as key ingredients 
to the efficient functioning of the market and the development of the economy.   
The key aims of this programme of reform were: to streamline consumer rights; to clarify 
aspects of consumer law; to modernise consumer law, particularly for the digital age; to 
deregulate for businesses; and to selectively enhance consumer protection.  Yet this 
programme of reform was beset by drafting problems, omissions, seemingly unintentional 
results, internal inconsistencies and tensions with EU law (which, as noted above, will survive 
Brexit).  Overall the resulting reforms suffer from five major deficiencies.  First, there is a lack 
of clarity in terms the policy or policies behind a number of the reform; the retorts to notions 
of confident consumers, and its linkage with competition in the market, were vague and 
unsatisfying.  Secondly, the reforms were often excessively complex; this is particularly so in 
relation to the remedies regime for both unfair commercial practices and the consumer 
supply contracts.  Thirdly, whilst some consolidation occurred as a result of this programme 
of reform, more fragmentation was created both within national law and with EU law; and in 
a number of instances the Sale of Goods Act 1979 was preferable for consumers.  Fourthly 
the reforms are tied to conceptual conservatism.  For example, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 
is built on a traditional contract model, which recognises the term-representation dichotomy.  
Yet non-contractual representations may, in reality, shape a consumer’s expectations as 
much as a contractual statement and, whilst the line between terms and representations 
continues to be blurred, there is fragmentation by the absence of the full treatment of 
representations in the Act.  Finally, the idea that a major piece of consumer legislation, even 
legislation which is better drafted that the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and which will almost 
inevitably contains detailed legal language, can without more make consumer rights more 
accessible is, with respect, misconceived.  If consumers are to be more confident, then 
different strategies for distilling and disseminating consumer rights (such as the Law 
Commission’s recommendation in its 2005 report on Unfair Terms in Contracts to incorporate 
examples, which could then be extracted), need to be embraced.   
Unfortunately there appears little appetite to address these issues at the present time.286 
 
 
                                                          
286 See Department for Exiting the European Union, Legislating for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the 
European Union, (Cm 9446, updated May 2017) at 2.17. 
